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4:14–34; Acts 13:15, 15:21, 17:2; 1 Tim 4:13) as well as the need to inter-
nalize its instructions (e.g., Deut 6:6–9, 11:18–21), all this in order to act 
upon the basis of conviction rather than coercion. Finally, Lanni argues that, 
even if the ancient Athenian “courts did not predictably and reliably enforce 
statutes,” still “these laws had a symbolic force that operated as a significant 
influence on everyday behavior” (118). Again, we find a parallel to ancient 
Israel, where the ideal was to have the law written on one’s heart rather than 
being enforced by social control.
In this way, I find Lanni’s book instructive for biblical studies on how 
Torah might have functioned in ancient Israel, as well as giving us a fascinat-
ing glimpse into ancient Athens. In addition, while our modern cultures are 
very different, they nevertheless draw from both ancient Israel and Athens. 
Therefore, it may be very instructive to reflect on how these societies sought 
to maintain peace and order differently than we do. 
Vesterålen, Norway Kenneth Bergland
Loose, Jonathan J., Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland, eds. The Black-
well Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018. 
xiv + 511 pp. Hardcover. USD 195.00.
The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism was put together to promote 
discussion on the nature of humans and their mental states—specifically 
views under the umbrella of substance dualism in a broad sense as well as 
critiques of these views from a variety of perspectives. The open intent of 
its organizers is “to construct a level playing ground of debate for all of the 
various positions and their critics” (1). The work was edited by Jonathan J. 
Loose (senior lecturer in philosophy and psychology at Heythrop College, 
University of London), Angus J. L. Menuge (professor of philosophy at Con-
cordia University Wisconsin and president of the Evangelical Philosophical 
Society), and J. P. Moreland (professor of philosophy at Talbot School of 
Theology, Biola University). 
The volume contains thirty-two articles written by twenty-nine contrib-
utors. After two introductory articles, the remaining ones are organized into 
three parts: first, “Articulating Substance Dualism”; second, “Alternatives 
to Substance Dualism,” and, third, “Substance Dualism, Theology, and the 
Bible.” Each of these parts is further divided into subsections, each containing 
two or three articles that debate a given topic from different perspectives so 
as to allow readers to “decide for themselves where the better arguments lie” 
(1). In part one, the debates are on emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism, 
Cartesian dualism, the unity of consciousness, and near-death experiences. In 
part two, authors debate animalism, nonreductive physicalism, constitution-
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alism, and emergent individualism. In part three, the debates are on biblical 
anthropology, the incarnation, and the resurrection. 
The main strength of the volume is its philosophical approach, as can 
be seen from the expertise of the editors and the methods utilized by most 
contributors. Articulating the nature of humans and of the human mind from 
a variety of philosophical stances gives readers a wealth of perspectives on the 
subject matter. A second asset of this companion is that it allows each topic 
of discussion to be dealt with from different and often opposing viewpoints. 
Thus, even though the volume is openly trying to support substance dualism, 
each of its favorable positions on any given topic is balanced by one contrary 
article. In this sense, readers are given the benefit of alternate proposals and 
solutions, though the number of articles favoring dualism is somewhat greater 
than those challenging it (nineteen to thirteen). A third positive observa-
tion, which I noticed sprinkled here and there throughout the book, is that 
while trying to make their case in a persuasive manner, some authors show 
an awareness that evidence alone does not suffice to make the case either 
way. As Gary Habermas puts it, “the real, underlying issue in these matters is 
very frequently not about straightforward dialogues regarding where the best 
evidence lies, but is more about a momentous clash of worldviews” (243). 
William Lycan (22, 34n3), Nancy Murphy (322–323), and Angus Menuge 
(394), to different degrees, also seem to be aware of, or acknowledge, the 
impact of worldviews (and the assumptions embedded in them) on the inter-
pretation of reality. I find this recognition helpful in studying human nature 
and the philosophy of mind because it points to a more realistic approach 
to these issues and warns readers against the naïve belief that data by itself is 
enough to convince people one way or another.
Given the Judeo-Christian theistic perspectives of most contributors and 
the editors’ intent to advance theism against naturalism (1, 10–11), some 
may perceive the volume’s modest interaction with and articulation of bibli-
cal material (only six of thirty-two articles deal more directly with biblical 
content, although several others do it tangentially) as a limitation. But this 
is not necessarily a weakness of this companion in comparison with other 
studies. It rather represents a wider phenomenon in the field of Christian 
philosophy and systematic theology where the interaction with biblical 
scholarship is minimal. Within this methodology, the contribution of biblical 
data and concepts in context of the ANE is not sufficiently influential in 
the development of anthropologies. This is a major disadvantage as it limits 
research and tends to lock the debate down to philosophical and/or system-
atic categories, often within the bandwidth of classical philosophy. For these 
reasons, among others, I will comment on the underrepresented category of 
biblical material and more specifically on the two articles that attempt to 
engage with the issue of human nature from a biblical perspective.
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John W. Cooper, author of the article “Biblical Anthropology Is Holistic 
and Dualistic,” advocates biblical anthropology as dualistic because “although 
God created and redeems humans as embodied persons, he sustains us disem-
bodied between death and bodily resurrection”—and holistic because “the 
person-body dichotomy [is] an abnormal and diminished condition” (415). 
In his interaction with biblical scholars Joel B. Green and N. T. Wright, 
Cooper asserts that all three of them affirm holism, and that therefore 
“holism is not at issue” (413). When assessing Green’s and Wright’s critiques 
of dualism, however, Cooper feels that their objections are anachronistic 
(because they critique historical, instead of contemporary dualistic articula-
tions) and inaccurate (because they fail to consider wholistic dualists). In order 
to advance his case, Cooper uses the following strategy: he attempts to define 
terms more narrowly and assesses OT anthropology in creation (Gen 2:7), the 
afterlife in the OT, and then anthropology and eschatology in Second Temple 
Judaism, closing with NT anthropology and eschatology.
A helpful contribution Cooper makes to the discussion is a call for more 
precise terminology, especially in regards to the distinction between monism 
and holism, since the two terms are often used interchangeably, which can 
create confusion (though the biblical data seem to defy the familiar catego-
ries “monism” and “dualism,” as we will see below). Another significant 
observation I can agree with is Cooper’s insistence that the biblical creation 
text in Gen 2:7 indicates “two basic ingredients from which God makes a 
nephesh chayah [a living being],” namely, “neshamah [breath] and dirt” (417). 
This appears to be an accurate description of the Genesis creation account. 
However—and now I turn to my critiques—I do not share Cooper’s conclu-
sion. For him, “this text therefore expresses generic dualism.” Such a leap 
requires assuming that the breath (or spirit) is a conscious, thinking, and 
somewhat operational person just lacking embodiment—an assumption 
not provided by the text. It is presupposed by Cooper, and it determines 
his conclusion. If one follows the narrative without this prior commitment, 
the account seems to suggest that consciousness and action result from the 
combination of the breath and the body (dust of the ground). Only after this 
unity of “ingredients” occurs do we have human existence and activity. In the 
creation narrative, living human beings are a third reality different from and 
greater than the sum of the two initial ingredients. Thus, when drawing data 
from the Genesis creation account alone, the phenomenon of human life can 
be described as some sort of emergent wholism, but not “generic dualism” 
as Cooper proposes. Cooper then applies the same dualistic reading to other 
biblical texts from which he tries to establish afterlife “subsistence.” This is 
the idea that permeates Cooper’s entire article. As he puts it, “the decisive 
issue is whether persons subsist after death” (418). But a more decisive issue 
for Cooper may be whether his assumption about the nature of the spirit/
breath is justified. Cooper’s interpretation is also colored by some genre and 
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style oversight, as well as a bit of neglect of the organic nature of anthropo-
logical metaphors (see Green, op. cit. below). Without them and without the 
prior commitment to afterlife subsistence, the texts Cooper analyses can be 
explained in other ways. Finally, Cooper generally analyses passages that only 
indirectly deal with human nature. For instance, he does not go over texts 
like Eccl 12:7, which discusses death—the disassembling of the ingredients 
for life (“and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns 
to God who gave it,” ESV; though here we do not have neshemah, but “its 
synonym ruach” [417]; see Gen 7:22 for a combined form). In its intratextual 
context, Eccl 12:7 does not entail dualism, for each ingredient by itself is 
not operational (see Eccl 9:5–6, 10). Hence, while Cooper brings important 
observations and clarifications to the discussion of human nature, his choice 
of texts is not optimum, and his dualistic interpretation is more the result of 
a precommitment to human subsistence in an intermediary state (Christian 
tradition) than a necessary conclusion from interpreting biblical passages in 
their proper loci (in context). 
Joel B. Green in “The Strange Case of the Vanishing Soul” documents 
the decline of the translation “soul” for the word ψυχή in English Bibles from 
thirty-nine occurrences back in the 1611 KJV to three in the 2011 CEB. 
According to Green, the phenomenon results from Bible linguists’ gradual 
forsaking of the popular English usage of “soul” “where it usually refers to 
an immaterial, immortal part of a human” and the adoption of terms that 
are more sensitive to the Greek nuances of ψυχή which refer to the various 
aspects of human life such as “person,” “life,” “inner person,” etc. (428). He 
explains the decline of the usage of the term “soul” in three ways: first, dualist 
tendencies brought into the NT text interpretation by theological and philo-
sophical traditions have been greatly challenged by historical research focused 
on the first-century background of the NT; second, sociocultural perceptions 
have conditioned Western readers’ understanding of human nature, and these 
cultural perceptions, in turn, are “read . . . back into” NT texts; third, “reread-
ing . . . New Testament texts that served previously as taken-for-granted illus-
trations of the New Testament’s anthropological dualism” (429). Green has 
done this elsewhere. In this article he rereads 1 Peter, which contains the word 
ψυχή six times. He notes that 1 Peter does not contain Philo’s “references to 
body and soul as discrete human essences,” or to the “soul’s sovereignty over 
the body,” or to “the body as a tent or shrine in which the soul might dwell” 
(435). The only dualism Green finds in 1 Peter is eschatological (“life in this 
world versus life in the age to come,” [436]), and concludes that “Peter’s 
anthropology is . . . twice embodied—bodily life . . . indivisible in terms of 
a person’s essential unity, but also full-bodied life among a people called to 
follow Christ’s example” (437). I appreciate Green’s documentation of the 
decline of the use of the word “soul” in recent translations as well as the 
reasons he gives for the phenomenon, though I am not so sure this is not also 
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influenced by “the natural sciences in the modern era,” as he suggests. To his 
credit, I concede that such influence does not detract from his exposition. I 
also welcome Green’s sensitivity to the powerful role of presuppositions in 
interpreting texts (430).
On the book as a whole, I agree with the editors that The Blackwell 
Companion to Substance Dualism is a “valuable resource for scholars in a 
variety of disciplines (notably, philosophy of mind, psychology, and theologi-
cal anthropology) and a useful reference for those interested in doing further 
work advancing the case for or against substance dualism” (11). 
Adventist University of São Paulo Flavio Prestes III
Van der Merwe, Christo H., Jacobus A. Naudé, and Jan H. Kroeze, eds. Bibli-
cal Hebrew Reference Grammar. 2nd ed. New York: T&T Clark, 2017. 
640 pp. Softcover. USD 43.16.
It has been a long wait for this significantly updated popular Biblical Hebrew 
Reference Grammar that first appeared in 1999 from Sheffield Academic 
Press. The first edition of this grammar was particularly popular among Bible 
translators but was also well received by students of biblical Hebrew and 
exegetes. The quality of its content was warranted by the academic quality of 
its authors. Particularly, van der Merwe’s work and research groups are well 
known in the field. His close work with Bible societies and Bible translation 
predestined him, together with Naudé and Kroeze, to write a grammar that 
shines as a reference tool for all those that work with biblical Hebrew on a 
regular basis. Today, a digital version of both the first and this second edi-
tion are available in Logos Bible Software and help to advance the exegetical 
workflow.
Now, after eighteen years, the grammar has been updated by an additional 
236 pages (current total of 640 pages), that is, more than 50 percent of the 
total page number of the first edition (404 pages). This amplification is 
caused by the integration of insights that were generated through the linguis-
tic research of the last 10 years: Andrason (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Oakes 
(2011), Cook (2012), Joosten (2012), Miller-Naude & Zevit (2012),Kahn 
(2013), Schniedewind (2013), van der Merwe (2013, 2014), Holmstedt 
(2014), Jones (2014), Rezetko & Young (2014), Lamprecht (2015), Naude 
(2015, 2016), Bivin (2017). 
Despite the massive updates, this edition still functions as a reference 
grammar (and this is good!) and lacks features that come with comprehensive 
grammars like the one of Joüon-Muraoka. But one can state firmly that this 
latest edition is the most up-to-date Hebrew grammar on the market and will 
be one of the most important reference works for Hebrew in the next decade.
